Technology Adoption under Fit Risk: What Should Development Project Donors and Managers Know?  by Parks, Moon et al.
 Procedia Engineering  107 ( 2015 )  3 – 10 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-7058 © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of HumTech2015
doi: 10.1016/j.proeng.2015.06.052 
ScienceDirect
Humanitarian Technology: Science, Systems and Global Impact 2015, HumTech2015 
Technology Adoption under Fit Risk: What Should Development 
Project Donors and Managers Know? 
Moon Parksa*, Sangeeta Bansalb, David Zilbermana 
a,Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley  94720, USA 
bCentre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110067, India  
Abstract 
While relevant and important in understanding technology adopters’ behavior, pre-acquisition fit risk in development projects is 
rarely discussed in the economics and development communities. This paper attempts to introduce fit risk in the development 
context and examines how its presence affects adoption of new technologies in development project settings. It also analyzes the 
impact of risk-reduction marketing tools on project uptake rate and their efficient utilization. 
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1. Introduction 
Development projects often promote introduction of new technologies frequently embodied in products or 
services. Issues related to adoption of these new products by targeted beneficiaries are an important component of 
development projects planning. Technology adoption is subject to many types of risks facing different stakeholders 
of development projects. For promoting a desired technology, it is important that donors choose instruments that 
not only promote its adoption amongst the targeted population but also promote its use since the benefits of 
adoption mostly stem from use of the technology. For example, the success of a project that aims to reduce indoor 
air pollution depends on the actual usage of the cooking stoves they promote [1]. The performance of malaria 
prevention projects depends on the diffusion rates of insecticide-treated bed nets or pills or diagnostic devices 
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promoted by the projects [2]. Therefore, the donors need to carefully select technologies prior to deciding which 
project to support. While planning and designing a technology, its developers have to deal with various 
uncertainties regarding not only the merits of the technology but also the characteristics of potential project 
beneficiaries (e.g. socio-cultural, geographical, economic or environmental factors of potential adopters). Once a 
technology for a development project is developed and produced, its intrinsic quality (e.g., performance, durability 
or end-user appropriation) is determined. It is often observed that when these technologies are implemented the 
benefits conferred are much lower than the anticipated benefits. The larger the gap is between anticipated and real 
benefits, the greater is the risk of the project’s failure [3]. Reyburn et al. (2004) reports that the rate of misdiagnosis 
of malaria in Tanzania is over 50% among individuals who received treatment for malaria at government hospitals 
[4]. The misdiagnosis of malaria and misallocation of treatment affected social learning and decreased new malaria 
therapy adoption rates [5].  
The behavior of technology adopters is also subject to many types of risks. To promote the adoption of new 
technologies, international donors, non-government organizations (NGOs) and non-profit organizations (NPOs) 
have been aggressively subsidizing and distributing them to broadly targeted populations in developing countries, 
yet these technologies are often adopted at low rates. The literature on technology adoption and development 
economics has examined the adoption behavior from various aspects including network externality [6], production 
(yield) risk [7,8], reference price [2, 9, 10], learning [11, 12] and social network [13]. However, one important 
omission in this picture that may affect potential adopter’s behavior is fit risk. Fit risk arises when potential 
adopters are uncertain whether or not the technology will fit their needs, lifestyles, or capabilities [14].  
Research on fit risk has been lacking in development economics even though it is especially relevant in the 
context of development, where potential adopters of new innovations encounter technologies that are foreign to 
them without an opportunity to experiment and adjust. This paper aims to examine potential resource misallocation 
due to fit risk, and to analyze the role of marketing tools like demonstration in order to reduce fit risk and enhance 
adoption efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is planned as follows: we discuss the role of fit risk on resource allocation and why 
stakeholders in development projects are more likely to be exposed to fit risk in sections 2 and 3. Section 4 
introduces risk-reduction marketing tools such as Money-Back Guarantee (MBG) and demonstration commonly 
used in developed countries. Then we present the role of demonstration on uptake rate in development projects 
using a simple threshold adoption model in section 5. Section 6 discusses the model predictions and related policy 
implications. Finally we conclude in section 7. 
2. Pre-acquisition Fit Risk 
Marketers in developed countries have recognized the important role of fit risk in acceptance of new products, 
yet the concept of fit risk is relatively new in the international development community. The concept of fit risk may 
be related to the quality of the technology but is inherently different. An improvement in the quality of a 
technology may increase the potential benefit among the target population, as well as improve probability of fit, but 
it does not eliminate individual-level risk of whether the new technology would fit a person or not. For example, 
the efforts by technology developers to take into account local weather conditions and socio-cultural factors when 
they produce insecticide-treated bed nets may narrow the gap between the planner’s conception and reality. Well-
designed bed nets for a particular local population would increase the quality of the technology, value (benefit) 
from adoption (if it fits), average probability of fit, and overall adoption rate among the local population. However, 
these bed nets would still not fit everyone in the population because of idiosyncratic differences amongst 
individuals. The fit risk arises from the fact that both the bed net providers and potential beneficiaries do not know 
whom the technology will fit and to whom it will not.  
In a broader sense, the likelihood of fit may differ across different populations for the same technology due to 
differences in socio-cultural, economic, geographic, and environmental factors. A technology that has been 
successful in some region may not be successful in another. For example, for the same insecticide-treated bed net 
product, the benefits and likelihood of fit among a project population would be different depending on whether the 
technology is implemented in Mombasa or in Nairobi even if they are located in the same country, Kenya.    
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It is important to highlight that fit risk creates different types of problems than those created by asymmetric 
information. Under asymmetric information, one party has the information while the other does not. Under fit risk, 
however, both the technology provider as well as the potential adopter do not know whether the technology would 
fit the adopter. Ignoring fit risk, therefore, will result in a different type of economic inefficiency and the treatments 
to address it should also be different. Fit risk is more likely to happen if the technology is an experienced good, 
which users need to use before knowing whether it meets their needs. Marketing strategies such as word of mouth 
or advertisement cannot solve this problem [15].  
Presence of fit risk leads to two forms of misallocation: one, the potential adopters are willing to pay an amount 
less than the potential benefit, and this leads to “unrealized demand”. Unrealized demand refers to the amount of 
technologies that would have been taken and used by the adopters if there was no fit frisk. The other source of 
misallocation is “waste” since a subset of those who acquire the technology either do not use it or use it in 
unintended ways due to mis-fit.  
Figure 1 explains these two sources of inefficiency due to fit risk. Suppose the targeted population is 
heterogeneous on both technology fit and the potential benefit if it fits. We assume that the fit is binary, i.e., takes 
value 0 if does not fit or 1 if it fits. The project beneficiaries benefit from the technology only if it fits. Suppose that 
potential beneficiaries’ perceived benefit from adoption is distributed between zero and upper bound  ܾ, according to 
some distribution. Each individual in the population can, then, be assigned to one of the regions of (A) to (F) in 
Figure 1. If there is no fit risk and the population knows whether or not the technology fits them, individuals whose 
benefit of adoption is higher than the acquisition price p and  for whom  the technology fits will acquire the 
technology and use it (denote b* the level of perceived benefit that makes an individual indifferent between purchase 
and not purchase). The quantity purchased is given by the sum of the regions (D) and (F). Under the existence of fit 
risk, on the other hand, potential adopters will take into account the uncertainty on fit and are willing to pay an 
amount less than the potential benefit. Therefore, only those people whose perceived technology quality (benefits) 
are high enough will acquire the technology (denote br that level of threshold benefit that makes an individual 
indifferent between purchase and not purchase in the presence of fit risk). The quantity purchased in this case is 
given by the sum of regions (E) and (F). After acquisition of the technology, however, people belonging to region 
(E) realize the technology does not fit them, and will eventually not use it. The amount of this technology becomes 
the waste (at least in project donors and planners’ perspectives). Project population belonging to region (D) do not 
acquire the technology even though it has potential to provide net positive benefits (their benefit from adoption is 
higher than the acquisition price p), it represents the unrealized demand. If donors provide subsidy, then the price of 
acquisition decreases, the threshold br will shift to the left and the uptake rate will become larger. If the technology 
is provided for free, all targeted populations from (A) to (F) will take it (or access it) and there will be no unrealized 
demand.  However, note that while subsidy increases the uptake rate, thereby increasing the size of adoption (region 
(F)), the waste due to unfit in region (E) also increases. Therefore, subsidy alone cannot eliminate fit risk.  
Donors who ignore fit risk tend to over-estimate project value and over-subsidize their instrument technology 
[16]. For some extreme cases, the benefits from technology adoption are very high to those for whom the technology 
fits, but likelihood of fit is very low. For example, in the case of a drug used to treat a specific disease, people who 
suffer from that disease would greatly benefit from the drug, but it would be useless for others. If the market for the 
technology is purely controlled by demand and supply, without any donors’ intervention, diffusion of the technology 
would be limited. Donors may be inclined to offer a high level of subsidy based on its large benefit to some people 
in the population. This can generate a significant amount of waste and decrease the project impact and value if the 
donors do not take fit risk into consideration.  
Figure1.Resource Allocation under Fit Risk 
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An anecdote from India illustrates how presence of fit risk may nullify benefits from a new technology. To 
streamline the system of governance and timely action on complaints received regarding corruption, malpractice, or 
misconduct, the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) of India started sending complaints received about various 
government departments to the concerned department via an online portal. The Police Department, however, did not 
respond to more than 600 anti-corruption complaints for 8 years because the responsible police officers did not 
know how to operate the online portal [17]. This example illustrates that even if a new technology may be good, it 
may not confer potential benefits if there is a mis-match between users’ know-how and the skills required for the 
technology.  
3. Exposure to Fit Risk in Development Projects 
Issues arising from resource misallocation due to fit risk in development project settings may be critical since 
stakeholders in development projects are especially exposed to fit risk for the following reasons;  
x Initiated from outside: technologies in development projects are mostly initiated by donors or NGOs who perceive 
additional social values or externality from the adoption of the technology by project beneficiaries, but the project 
beneficiaries do not necessarily fully perceive these benefits and are unaware of the needs of the technology 
adopters.  
x Selected by outside: the technologies in development projects tend to be developed by limited numbers of 
scientists or inventors and are chosen by donors (not by potential adopters) prior to the implementation of the 
development projects. These technologies are often foreign to the potential beneficiaries, and require some level 
of training on how to use them or modification of their lifestyles.  
x Scale up for all: international donors and implementing agents tend to use the same technology for different 
targeted populations in multiple countries to scale up the technology once it is effective in some small population. 
Since implementing agents have only limited resources, they may not have adequate incentives to modify 
technologies to capture local population heterogeneity during the scale up phase.  
x Boost Take-up for Adoption: Because rigorous impact evaluation and follow up studies to measure actual usage 
rate are costly and difficult, donors and implementing agents tend to use take-up rate to evaluate technology 
adoption. Therefore, subsidy provision is more likely to be used to boost take-up rate than investment in efforts to 
increase adoption efficiency (e.g., eliminating fit risk). However, greater level of subsidy leads to larger size of 
waste if there is no mechanism to screen who among the potential beneficiaries would actually benefit from the 
new technology. 
x Short Term Technology Provision: Donors and implementation agents usually set the level of subsidy (acquisition 
price for potential adopters) and goal of distribution quantity in advance. The distribution of the targeted amount 
of the technology to project beneficiaries occurs in a relatively short period of time. This results in local 
implementing agents having limited flexibility and incentive to develop long term strategies that improve 
adoption efficiency and technology diffusion.   
Even if all the stakeholders in development projects may have to deal with fit risk, incentives and gains from 
eliminating the fit risk may differ across the stakeholders.   
4. Risk-reduction Marketing Tools 
Most marketers in developed countries have been concerned about pre-purchase fit risk and have used risk-
reduction mechanisms such as Money-Back Guarantee (MBG) and demonstration. Understanding fit risk is 
important for marketers as they deal with introduction of new products in targeted markets and existence of 
individual level fit risk affects product purchase decision and alters market demand [18]. 
 Money-Back Guarantee (MBG) is a marketing tool that allows the consumers to receive some or all of their 
payment back if the purchased product does not meet the consumer’s expectation and to return the item within a 
given period of time [14]. The main purpose of MBGs is reducing pre-purchase fit uncertainty, but they also provide 
positive signals for product quality or retailer service [19]. The marketing literature finds that MBGs have more 
impact on risk reduction than either price reduction or brand name [20], and induce consumers’ positive cognitive 
effects, thereby increase purchase intention and willingness to pay [21].  
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Demonstration is a tool that allows consumers to experience the product before purchase. It serves as a revealing 
mechanism that reveals to the potential buyers whether the product is suitable for them and would confer the 
potential benefit. Free trial for a limited time period is also a form of demonstration and allows consumers to 
experience the product in a more convenient environment (e.g. computer software trial). Demonstration reduces 
potential customer’s resistance [22], and affects consumers’ prior beliefs about the product [23]. The effect of 
demonstration may depend on duration, effort, and intensity of demonstration. Short-term demonstration does not 
necessarily increase the value of the technology itself while long-term and/or intensive demonstration can increase 
the value of technology through learning by doing. Demonstration may also be combined with educational sessions 
or social marketing promotions aiming to change social norms and to nudge potential adopters to use new 
technologies.  
Both MBGs and demonstration (e.g. test drive) remove uncertainty about the fitness of the technology to an 
individual by providing personalized experience with the technology and are widely implemented by retailers and 
manufacturers in developed countries. MBGs and Demonstrations are different from simple information provision 
as they can capture idiosyncratic differences of fitness among individuals. While most consumers in the developed 
countries have experienced some form of demonstration or MBG in their purchase decisions via various return 
policies, these marketing tools are rare in developing countries. Potential consumers in developing countries may be 
more prone to fit risk due to limited availability and poor quality of information regarding newly introduced 
technologies. It may be difficult to implement MBG in developing countries because market environments there 
often lack infrastructure and systems to support such transactions and marketing managements. Demonstration, on 
the other hand, requires less reliable transaction infrastructure and trust between sellers and buyers. Simple 
demonstration effort can reduce fit risk and waste in development projects. In the anecdote from India cited above in 
Section 2, demonstration of the new technology in the form of training on the use of online portal could have 
removed inefficiency. Such a demonstration would have acted as a screening device to know who amongst the 
police officers knew use of computers. These officers, then, could have been provided with training in the use of 
online portal. This simple effort would have resulted in timely action on complaints and prevented inefficiency. 
5. Model: Impact of Demonstration on Uptake Rate 
In this section, we examine how demonstration affects project uptake rate. This analysis would provide insight as 
to why it is important for development project planners to be of aware of the heterogeneity among project 
beneficiaries during their project evaluation. We use a simple stylized threshold model to analyze the role of 
demonstration in improving project value. A donor wishes to introduce a new technology that has potential benefits 
to a population. Given heterogeneity among potential beneficiaries, the new technology may not be suitable for 
everyone in the population. In our terminology, “it may not fit everyone”. Further assume that population is also 
heterogeneous in terms of benefits that accrue from the new technology. We can divide the population in different 
groups according to the probability of fit. Let qk denote the probability of fit in group k. Within group k, the benefits 
from the technology, b, vary across population with a continuous cumulative distribution function Fk(b) and density 
function fk(b). Thus we are assuming that the probability of fit remains same within a group and differs across 
groups. Further the benefits from technology adoption (if the technology fits) are different amongst different 
members of a group. Individual i belonging to group k perceives that her accrued benefit will be bki with probability 
qk, and zero with probability (1-qk). The expected benefit then is qkbki. The market demand is determined by the 
mass of such consumers in the targeted population whose expected benefit from acquiring the technology is larger 
than the unit cost, p. The uptake rate for the group k, denoted by QR,k is given by   
 
ܳோ,௞(p, ݍ௞) = ׬  ௞݂(ܾ)ܾ݀௕௕כ = [1െ ܨ௞(ܾ௞כ)]                                                                                                    (1) 
 
where bk* denotes marginal consumer in group k indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing. Under 
probability of fit qk, and price, p, the marginal consumer indifferent between buying and not buying is given by bk*Ł
p/qk.  
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ܳோ,௞(p, ݍ௞) = ׬  ௞݂(ܾ)ܾ݀௕౦ ೜ೖ
= ቂ1 െ ܨ௞ ቀ ୮ ௤ೖቁቃ                                                                                                   (2) 
The overall uptake rate for the project population, DR, is the sum of these group take-up rates weighted by the 
relative group size Ȧk = Nk/N   and is given by  
 
ܦோ(ܳோ,௞  ,߱௞) = σ ߱௞ܳோ,௞(݌, ݍ௞)௞                                                                                                                   (3) 
 
Demonstration serves as a revealing mechanism that informs potential adopters about their fit and eliminates fit 
uncertainty. Under effective demonstration, potential adopters get to know whether the technology would fit them or 
not prior to their purchase decision. In this case, the anticipated uptake rate for group k is given by 
 
Q୒ୖ,୩(p, ݍ௞) ؠ ݍ௞ ׬  ௞݂(ܾ)ܾ݀௕௣ = ݍ௞[1 െ ܨ௞(p)]                                                                                             (4) 
 
And the impact of eliminating fit risk for group k will be 
 
M୩ (p, ݍ௞) =  ݍ௞[1 െ ܨ௞(݌)] െ  ቂ1 െ ܨ௞ ቀ ୮ ௤ೖቁቃ                                                                                               (5) 
                =  ௤ೖ
௕ೖି ௕ೖ ൫ܾ௞ െ ݌൯ െ  
ଵ
௕ೖି ௕ೖ ቀܾ௞ െ
୮
 ௤ೖቁ             
 
Overall impact of such efforts on project uptake is the weighed sum of the subgroup impact. The second equality 
in (5) is under the assumption that the perceived technology quality b has a uniform distribution with support [ܾ, ܾ]. 
This assumption allows us to obtain closed form solution for the impact of demonstration on uptake rate.  
We can graphically explain the impact of eliminating fit risk on project uptake rate using Figure 1. For each 
group, anticipate uptake under given fit risk to be the sum of regions (E) and (F). However, the technology does not 
fit individuals in region (E), so if they come to know about their mis-fit prior to their purchase decision, they would 
not acquire the technology. Individuals belonging to region (D) would acquire the technology since they now know 
the technology would give them net positive benefits. Thus group anticipated market demand after eliminating fit 
risk corresponds to the sum of regions (D) and (F) in Figure 1. Overall effect of eliminating fit risk on uptake of the 
group is given by (D-E), which may be positive or negative depending on the distribution of b, and q. 
Figures 2 (a) and (b) plot the anticipated project uptake and impact of demonstration on uptake across different 
level of q, assuming b to be uniformly distributed over [0, 1] with the price of the technology p equal to 0.3.  In 
Figure 2 (a) the curve in filled dots represents the anticipated uptake as a function of q under presence of fit risk. 
The curve in empty dots shows the anticipated uptake after eliminating fit risk. Curves in Figure 2 (b) show the 
impact of demonstration on uptake rate. The impact of demonstration on uptake rate is either positive or negative 
based on the levels of q. In particular, for a group with a relatively high likelihood of technology fit, a project 
manager would be more likely to observe decrease in uptake after implementing demonstration while she would 
observe increase in uptake for the group with relatively low probability of fit.  It is important to note, however, that 
the decrease in uptake rate is because the impact of demonstration on waste prevention dominates its impact on 
inducing new unrealized demand. In other words, as the likelihood of fit is higher, the size of region (E) in Figure 1 
is greater than the size of region (D), so the (D-E) becomes negative. Overall project uptake rate and impact of risk-
reduction marketing tools on uptake rate will be determined by the distribution of these fit level groups. 
Figure 2 (a) Anticipated Uptake (b) Demonstration Impact on Uptake; Plot with p=0.3, b ~unif [0, 1] 
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6. Policy Implication 
Development donors and NGOs often use uptake rate as an important indicator to assess the success of their 
projects since determining usage rate is difficult and expensive. This assessment could be misleading. Even when 
donors or project planners are not aware of fit risk, some level of demonstration like free trial or short-term free 
distribution is common in many development projects for purposes of information provision.  
Under the existence of fit risk, promotion efforts like demonstration lead to an increase in adoption efficiency by 
providing a better match between individuals and the technology, but it may not necessarily increase market 
demand. Even in cases where demonstration decreases market demand, donors and planners may gain from 
demonstration through preventing waste and improving technology adoption precision. This is especially true when 
there is heterogeneity amongst population. Our results hold even if we do not incorporate any learning from using 
the technology. More importantly, the model predicts that as more people in project population belong to high level 
of probability fit group, the impact of demonstration on uptake is more likely to be negative. This prediction is 
counterintuitive. Conventional wisdom would suggest that demonstration should improve take up rate of better fit 
technologies. If project donors and planners are not aware of fit risk and do not take into account the heterogeneity 
of fit among project population, assessment of project based on uptake rate may mask true project value. 
7. Conclusion 
While relevant and important in the development context, pre-acquisition fit risk is rarely discussed in the 
economics and development community. This paper attempts to introduce fit risk in the development context by 
borrowing from a large literature in marketing, and examining how its presence affects adoption and usage of new 
technologies in development project settings. It also analyzes the impact of a marketing tool, demonstration, on 
project uptake rate across different levels of probability fit perceived by project population. Our model shows that 
for a heterogeneous population, the impact of promotion efforts such as demonstration on uptake rate can be non-
monotonic across levels of probability of fit. Impact assessment of projects can ignore these dynamics and provide 
wrong evaluation of the projects to project donors and planners. We also show how use of simple marketing tools 
like demonstration can improve efficiency of projects. This paper is based on a conceptual framework, but hopefully 
it will broaden research on fit risk including empirical studies on the use and value of marketing strategies to 
enhance adoption and improve efficiency of technologies provided by international donors, NGOs and NPOs. 
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